The role of squeezing in quantum key distribution based on homodyne
  detection and post-selection by Horak, Peter
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
03
06
13
8v
2 
 1
7 
Se
p 
20
03
The role of squeezing in quantum key distribution
based on homodyne detection and post-selection
Peter Horak
Optoelectronics Research Centre, University of Southampton,
Southampton SO17 1BJ, UK
June 20, 2018
Abstract
The role of squeezing in quantum key distribution with continuous
variables based on homodyne detection and post-selection is investigated
for several specific eavesdropping attacks. It is shown that amplitude
squeezing creates strong correlations between the signals of the legitimate
receiver and a potential eavesdropper. Post-selection of the received pulses
can therefore be used to reduce the eavesdropper’s knowledge of the raw
key, which increases the secret key rate by orders of magnitude over large
distances even for modest amounts of squeezing.
1 Introduction
Quantum cryptography or quantum key distribution was first proposed nearly
two decades ago [1] as a method to exploit properties of small quantum systems
to establish a secret key between a sender (Alice) and a receiver (Bob) which
is provably secure against attacks by an eavesdropper (Eve). In recent years
this field has attracted a lot of research and rapid progress has been achieved in
the theoretical description and in experimental demonstrations. In particular,
the range over which a secure key can be established has now been extended
up to 101 km in optical fibres [2, 3, 4] and 23 km in air [5, 6]. However, most
of these systems are based on the transmission of single photons and suffer
from inefficient and slow single-photon sources and detectors. These technical
restrictions lead to very low secret key bit rates, e.g. down to 15 bit/s in the
case of [2], and to a maximum distance beyond which no secure key can be
transmitted at all [7].
In order to overcome these limitations, a new class of quantum crypto-
systems has been proposed, where information is encoded in continuous variables
such as field quadratures [8, 9, 10, 11], photon numbers [12], or polarisation [13].
These schemes are based on the transmission of non-classical states of light, i.e.
squeezed or entangled states, and are restricted to transmission lines with less
than 50 % loss.
Very recently, however, it has been shown that quantum key distribution
can operate over arbitrarily lossy channels using only classical, i.e. coherent,
quantum states of light. This is achieved by reverse reconciliation techniques
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[14] or by post-selection [15, 16]. The first quantum crypto-system of this kind
has already been demonstrated by Grangier and co-workers [17].
In this paper, the effect of squeezing on the performance of quantum key
distribution with post-selection is investigated. For the schemes operating with
transmission lines with less than 50% loss [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13], squeezing guar-
antees that the smaller part of the pulse lost in the transmission or intercepted
by Eve has much larger quantum uncertainties and thus less information than
the larger part received by Bob. One therefore might think that for losses larger
than 50%, where Eve potentially has access to a larger fraction of the pulse than
Bob, squeezing might act in favour of the eavesdropper. The main purpose of
this work is to show that squeezing still is beneficial beyond the 50% loss limit
in post-selection based schemes.
This work is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the quantum
key distribution scheme [16]. Then two classes of eavesdropping attacks are in-
vestigated which clearly demonstrate the merits of using squeezed states. First,
intercept-resend strategies are analysed in section 3, where Eve performs a mea-
surement on the whole pulse sent by Alice and resends a pulse to Bob according
to her measurement results. Two specific measurements based on quadrature
detection and phase detection, respectively, are discussed as well as the optimal
orthogonal state projection measurement. It is shown that squeezing reduces
Eve’s chances of success with this attack. The second attack, discussed in sec-
tion 4, is a superior channel attack, where Eve keeps that part of the pulse
which would normally be lost in the transmission channel from Alice to Bob,
and transmits the rest of the pulse through a lossless channel to Bob. This kind
of attack cannot be detected by Alice and Bob. The maximum amount of secret
information which can be obtained despite Eve’s presence is calculated for an
Eve restricted to quadrature measurements and a lower bound is given for the
case where Eve is allowed to perform arbitrary measurements. Also for this kind
of attack squeezing can significantly enhance the secret key rate. Finally, the
results are summarised in section 5.
2 Quantum key distribution with homodyne de-
tection and post-selection
The scheme presented here is a generalisation of the recent proposal by Namiki
and Hirano [16], where Alice sends squeezed states instead of coherent (classical)
pulses. Without the post-selection process the scheme is also equivalent to the
scheme by Funk and Raymer [12] which is based on the simultaneous transmis-
sion of two pulses in orthogonal polarisation states obtained from a parametric
amplification process. It can be shown by a unitary transformation that the
latter entangled state is equivalent to a product state of a weak amplitude-
squeezed pulse (corresponding to the pulse sent by Alice here) and a strong
(phase-squeezed) pulse (the local oscillator used for homodyne detection).
The scheme works as follows. First, Alice prepares a minimum-uncertainty
squeezed pulse with field amplitude α0 and squeezing parameter r. Both α0 and
r are assumed to be real numbers, r > 0 corresponds to an amplitude-squeezed
state, r < 0 to a phase-squeezed state, and r = 0 to a coherent state. Alice then
applies a phase shift θ ∈ {0, π/2, π, 3π/2} to the pulse, where θ = 0 (θ = π/2)
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is interpreted as a bit 1 in basis 1 (basis 2) and θ = π (θ = 3π/2) as a bit 0 in
basis 1 (2). The resulting state reads
|ψθ〉 = exp
(
α0e
iθa† − α0e−iθa
)
exp
(
(re−2iθa2 − re2iθa†2)/2) |0〉 (1)
where a (a†) is Alice’s photon annihilation (creation) operator and |0〉 is the
vacuum state.
Next, Alice sends this state to Bob. During this transmission the pulse
experiences attenuation, that is, a fraction of the pulse is either absorbed by the
environment or intercepted by Eve. In both cases the transmission is modeled by
a beam-splitter of amplitude transmission T and reflectionR, where T 2+R2 = 1.
The output mode operators (b, b†) and (e, e†) correspond to the modes in Bob’s
and Eve’s detectors, respectively, and are related to the input mode operators
(a, a†) and the additional (vacuum) input mode (v, v†) of the beam-splitter by(
b
e
)
=
(
T R
−R T
)(
a
v
)
. (2)
For the following it is convenient to express the quantum state of the transmitted
pulse |ψθ〉 in terms of its Wigner quasi-probability function for Bob’s (complex)
measurement variable β and Eve’s variable ǫ. One finds
Wθ(β, ǫ) =
4
π2
exp
{
−2
[
e2rR{α}2 + e−2rI {α}2
]}
× exp
{
−2
[
|Rβ + T ǫ|2
]}
(3)
where R and I denote real and imaginary parts, respectively, and
α = (Tβ −Rǫ)e−iθ − α0. (4)
In the next step of the quantum key distribution protocol, Bob randomly
decides which of the two basis sets he uses for his detection. If he chooses
basis 1 he measures the real part βr of his variable β by homodyne detection,
otherwise he measures the imaginary part βi. His measurement results follow
the probability distributions
Pθ(βr) =
∫
Wθ(β, ǫ)dβidǫrdǫi, (5)
Pθ(βi) =
∫
Wθ(β, ǫ)dβrdǫrdǫi. (6)
If his measurement result fulfills |βr,i| < βc, where βc is a fixed threshold value,
Bob tells Alice to disregard this bit. Otherwise he assigns value 1 to his bit if
βr,i > βc, or value 0 if βr,i < −βc. This post-selection is the key to allow for
quantum key distribution over, in principle, arbitrarily large distances [15, 16].
Alice and Bob additionally announce their used basis sets and disregard all bits
where they used different sets.
After this step, Alice and Bob share a string of bits which in general contains
some errors and about which Eve has a certain amount of information. Alice
and Bob then use (classical) error correction and privacy amplification proto-
cols which leaves them with an identical secret key about which Eve has only
negligible information.
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As an example let us assume that Alice sends the state |ψ0〉, i.e. θ = 0. In
this case, Bob’s probabilities read
P0(βr) =
√
2
π
exp
{
−2 (βr−Tα0)2T 2e−2r+R2
}
√
T 2e−2r +R2
, (7)
P0(βi) =
√
2
π
exp
{
−2 β2iT 2e2r+R2
}
√
T 2e2r +R2
. (8)
For an amplitude-squeezed state (r > 0), Bob thus finds a Gaussian distribution
with a narrow width if he measures the quadrature βr, and a broad width for
measurements of βi. The probability of finding a bit 1 or 0 in the correct basis
(basis 1 in the example here) is thus
P (1) =
∫ ∞
βc
P0(βr)dβr =
1
2
+
1
2
Φ
(√
2(Tα0 − βc)√
T 2e−2r +R2
)
, (9)
P (0) =
∫ −βc
−∞
P0(βr)dβr =
1
2
− 1
2
Φ
( √
2(Tα0 + βc)√
T 2e−2r +R2
)
, (10)
where Φ denotes the usual error function. For r = 0 equations (7)-(10) reduce
to the results found in [16]. The fraction of accepted bits is
racc =
P (1) + P (0)
2
, (11)
where the factor 1/2 comes from disregarding all bits where Alice and Bob use
different basis sets, and the bit error rate of accepted bits is
δ =
P (0)
P (0) + P (1)
. (12)
The expected amount of Shannon information shared by Alice and Bob per
accepted bit is obtained by averaging over Bob’s measurement outcomes,
IAB =
∫ ∞
βc
dβr
P0(βr) + P0(−βr)
P (0) + P (1)
×{1 + δ(βr) log2 δ(βr) + (1− δ(βr)) log2(1− δ(βr))} (13)
where
δ(βr) =
P0(−βr)
P0(βr) + P0(−βr) (14)
is the bit error rate conditioned on Bob’s measured value of βr. Thus the average
information gain per transmitted bit is
GAB = raccIAB. (15)
An example for the quantities (11)-(15) as a function of the threshold value
βc is shown in figure 1. For the chosen parameters and for βc = 0, half of all
transmitted bits are accepted, but the bit error rate is relatively large and thus
the information IAB per accepted bit is low. Increasing βc reduces racc but
4
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Figure 1: Quantum key distribution over a lossless channel: acceptance rate
racc (dotted line), bit error rate δ per accepted bit (dash-dotted), information
per accepted bit IAB (dashed) and average information gain per transmitted bit
GAB (solid line). The parameters are α0 = 0.6, r = 0, T = 1.
also decreases the bit error rate. The figure shows that the average information
gain GAB per bit decreases with increasing βc. It therefore seems advantageous
for Bob to set βc = 0. However, in a realistic setup Alice and Bob will try to
optimise the secret key bit rate, i.e. the difference between their shared infor-
mation and the information leaked to Eve. This subject will be discussed later
in section 4. Note that due to the form of the expressions (9), (10) the qualita-
tive behaviour of the quantities plotted in figure 1 is the same for all squeezing
parameters r and transmission coefficients T .
3 Intercept-resend attacks
In this section I will investigate the security of the protocol against eavesdrop-
ping attacks where Eve intercepts each pulse, performs a measurement on it, and
then sends a pulse to Bob in the state which she thinks was initially prepared
by Alice. First, two specific eavesdropping strategies based on simultaneous
measurements of both quadrature components and on phase measurement, re-
spectively, will be analysed. In the third subsection the ideal intercept-resend
attack will be constructed based on general quantum measurement theory.
In the following I will concentrate on Eve’s probability pcorr to guess cor-
rectly the bit and the basis of Alice’s pulse. With probability 1 − pcorr, Eve
will thus transmit a pulse to Bob that differs from the original one, which Alice
and Bob can detect by an increase of the bit error rate δ or, for example, by
a change of the distribution of Bob’s measured quadrature components or the
measured value of racc.
3.1 Simultaneous quadrature measurement
For the first attack investigated here let us assume that Eve splits each pulse
into two parts on a 50-50 beam-splitter, measures one quadrature component
in one output arm, and simultaneously the orthogonal quadrature component
in the other arm.
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Eve’s measurement results are described by the expressions derived in sec-
tion 2 if T = R = 1/
√
2 and assuming that Eve performs measurements on
both output arms of the beam-splitter (2). Specifically, let us assume that Eve
measures βr and ǫi. The joint probability distribution is given by
Pθ(βr, ǫi) =
∫
Wθ(β, ǫ)dβidǫr (16)
which for all parameters factorises into two independent probability distribu-
tions
Pθ(βr, ǫi) = Pθ(βr)Pθ(ǫi). (17)
For θ = 0, Pθ(βr) is given by equation (7) and
P0(ǫi) =
√
2
π
exp
{
−2 ǫ2iT 2+R2e2r
}
√
T 2 +R2e2r
(18)
with T 2 = R2 = 1/2.
If Eve’s measurement outcome is (βr, ǫi) she will attribute the pulse to the
value θ ∈ {0, π/2, π, 3π/2} for which Pθ(βr, ǫi) is maximum. For r ≤ 0 this
yields θ = 0 for βr ≥ |ǫi|, θ = π/2 for ǫi > |βr|, θ = π for −βr ≥ |ǫi|, θ = 3π/2
for −ǫi > |βr|. For r > 0, which is the interesting case for the purpose of this
work, finding the most probable value of θ is more complicated. Let us assume
that Eve finds βr, ǫi > 0. She will then attribute this result to θ = 0 if
ǫi < βr <
√
2α0
1− e−2r − ǫi or
√
2α0
1− e−2r − ǫi < βr < ǫi. (19)
The remaining areas in the quadrant βr, ǫi > 0 are attributed to θ = π/2, and
the results for the other three quadrants of (βr, ǫi) follow by symmetry. Eve’s
rate of success for this attack is thus given by
pcorr = 2
∫
A0
P0(βr, ǫi)dβrdǫi (20)
where A0 is the area defined by (19).
Figure 2 shows the efficiency of the simultaneous measurement attack for
various parameters. For any given post-selection threshold βc and squeezing
parameter r, Alice adjusts the mean amplitude α0 such that δ = 10
−3 for lossless
transmission and without Eve’s interference. The values for α0 for r = 0 and
r = 0.5 are shown in figure 2(a) together with the resulting fraction of accepted
bits racc (the abscissa of the plot is scaled such that this curve is identical for
all values of r). The dashed lines in figure 2(b) show Eve’s probability pcorr of
success for r = 0 and r = 0.5. For any amount of squeezing, Bob can decrease
Eve’s success rate by increasing βc. The reason for this is that larger post-
selection thresholds allow for the use of weaker pulses, see figure (a), which in
turn gives larger overlaps of the pulses corresponding to different values of θ in
Eve’s measurement. However, larger thresholds also lead to lower bit acceptance
rates and thus slower secret key generation. The use of squeezed pulses helps
to reduce this problem, since in this case already low values of βc lead to a low
probability of success for Eve’s attack. This is due to the lower intensity of the
pulses sent by Alice and the increased uncertainty in the quadrature components
measured by Eve because of the vacuum noise on the second input port of Eve’s
beam-splitter.
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Figure 2: Intercept-resend attack for different post-selection thresholds βc and
varying squeezing. (a) Choice of α0 for r = 0 (solid line) and r = 0.5 (dashed)
such that δ = 10−3. Dotted line is the corresponding fraction racc of accepted
bits. (b) Eve’s success rate pcorr for simultaneous quadrature measurements
(dashed lines), phase measurements (dash-dotted), and optimised state projec-
tion measurements (solid).
3.2 Phase measurement
Using simultaneous quadrature measurement, Eve obtains estimates for the am-
plitude and phase of each pulse. However, in the scheme discussed here the
amplitude of all states |ψθ〉 is the same and Eve is in fact only interested in
measuring the phase. A better eavesdropping attack might therefore be based
on an adaptive phase measurement [18] which uses heterodyne detection with
nonlinear feedback and which in certain limits can approach the optimal mea-
surement of the phase of a single pulse.
The distribution of the phase φ ∈ [0, 2π) detected by an optimal phase
measurement on a state |ψθ〉 is given by
Pθ(φ) =
1
2π
|〈φ|ψθ〉|2 (21)
where
|φ〉 =
∞∑
n=0
einφ
a†n√
n!
|0〉. (22)
If Eve measures a certain phase φ, she will attribute this result to that state |ψθ〉
for which Pθ(φ) is maximum. The success rate of this eavesdropping strategy
is thus
pcorr =
∫
F0
P0(φ) dφ (23)
where
F0 =
{
φ|P0(φ) > max(Pπ/2(φ), Pπ(φ), P3π/2(φ))
}
. (24)
Evaluation of equation (21) in the Fock basis and subsequent numerical
integration of (23) yield the results shown by the dash-dotted curves in figure
2. Compared to the simultaneous quadrature measurement discussed above the
phase measurement leads to a larger success rate pcorr for Eve. However, the
qualitative behaviour is similar. In particular, squeezing is found to reduce the
eavesdropping efficiency significantly also for phase measurements.
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3.3 Orthogonal state projection
In the scheme presented here, each pulse sent by Alice is one of the four linearly
independent and non-orthogonal states |ψθ〉. For this particular case, Eve’s
ideal measurement, i.e. the one which gives the largest value of pcorr, is known
to be a projection measurement on four orthogonal states in the Hilbert space
Hs spanned by the four states |ψθ〉 [19]. Such a projection measurement is
extremely difficult to realise experimentally, but theoretical proposals for situa-
tions involving only two coherent states exist, see e.g. [20].
In the following I will construct the optimal projection measurement. For
this it is necessary to find four orthogonal states |ϕθ〉, θ ∈ {0, π/2, π, 3π/2},
which maximise
pcorr =
1
4
∑
θ
|〈ϕθ|ψθ〉|2. (25)
Since the states |ψθ〉 are obtained from a single state by the phase shift oper-
ator U = exp(iπa†a/2), it can be assumed that the states |ϕθ〉 obey the same
symmetry, that is,
|ϕθ+π/2〉 = U |ϕθ〉. (26)
The operator U has the eigenvalues ±1 and ±i. Let |uν〉, ν ∈ {±1,±i}, denote
the corresponding ortho-normal eigenvectors in Hs. Then, the states |ϕθ〉 can
be written as
|ϕθ〉 =
∑
ν
qθ,ν|uν〉. (27)
The orthogonality and normalisation of the states |ϕθ〉 together with equation
(26) implies |qθ,ν| = 1/2. In order to maximise |〈ϕθ|ψθ〉| and therefore pcorr the
complex phases of qθ,ν are obtained (up to a global phase) as
qθ,ν =
1
2
〈uν |ψθ〉
|〈uν |ψθ〉| . (28)
The states |uν〉, |ϕθ〉 and therefore the optimal value of pcorr can be obtained
numerically for given parameters α0 and r. It has also been checked that the set
of states |ϕθ〉 constructed in this way yields the optimal orthogonal projection
measurement even without the a priori requirement of the symmetry (26).
Results of this optimal intercept-resend attack for two values of r are shown
by the solid curves in figure 2(b). As expected, Eve’s rate of success pcorr is
larger for this attack than for either of the two attacks analysed above for all
parameters. Increasing the post-selection threshold βc reduces pcorr to below
70% for coherent as well as squeezed states for the parameters shown in the
figure. Using squeezed states allows to use lower thresholds and therefore to
obtain larger acceptance rates racc.
However, it is important to note that for too small values of α0, corre-
sponding to larger βc in figure 2, squeezing increases pcorr and thus helps the
eavesdropper. This can be understood in the following way. Without squeez-
ing (r = 0) and in the limit of α0 → 0, all four states |ψθ〉 become identical
to the vacuum state. Eve’s probability of guessing bit and basis correctly thus
approaches 1/4. For squeezed states, on the other hand, |ψ0〉 and |ψπ〉 approach
the vacuum state squeezed by r in the a+a† quadrature, but |ψπ/2〉 and |ψ3π/2〉
approach the vacuum state squeezed by r in the a− a† quadrature. Thus, Eve
can still detect the basis (but not the bit) in which a pulse was sent with large
probability. For example for r = 0.5 this gives pcorr ≈ 0.4.
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4 Superior channel attack
In the second class of eavesdropping attacks discussed in this paper, Eve is
assumed to possess an ideal quantum memory and a lossless channel. She uses
a beam-splitter to extract that part of the pulse which would normally be lost
in the transmission channel from Alice to Bob, stores it in her quantum memory
and sends the rest of the pulse through the lossless channel to Bob. She then
waits for Bob’s public announcement which basis he used and afterwards she
performs a measurement on her part of the pulse. This kind of attack cannot
be detected by Alice and Bob since Eve’s interference is indistinguishable from
the standard transmission loss.
Since Alice and Bob cannot infer Eve’s presence from their data, they have
to assume the worst case and therefore attribute all of their transmission losses
to Eve. In order to establish a secure key it is necessary to derive an upper
bound of the information available to Eve, such that in the final stage of the
protocol Eve’s knowledge about the key can be reduced to arbitrarily low levels
using privacy amplification. Here I will derive such an upper bound following
the lines of Lu¨tkenhaus [21, 7].
4.1 Quadrature measurement
In a first step I will assume that Eve uses only linear optics for her measure-
ment, that is, after Bob’s public announcement of his basis Eve uses a balanced
homodyne detector to measure the correct quadrature component of her part
of the pulse.
The fundamental quantity of the following derivation is the joint measure-
ment probability Pθ(βr, ǫr)
Pθ(βr, ǫr) =
∫
Wθ(β, ǫ)dβidǫi (29)
that Bob obtains the value βr and simultaneously Eve obtains ǫr when Alice
sends a pulse |ψθ〉. For θ = 0 this can be evaluated as
P0(βr, ǫr) =
2
π
er exp
{−2 [e2r(Tβr −Rǫr − α0)2 + (Rβr + T ǫr)2]} . (30)
For coherent states, r = 0, this can be factorised and hence Bob’s and Eve’s
measurements are independent. For squeezed states, on the other hand, the
joint probability distribution does not factorise and the two measurements are
correlated. In particular, for r > 0 as depicted in figure 3, the measurements
are anti-correlated, that is, if Bob measures a relatively large value of βr, Eve
is likely to measure a small value of ǫr. Hence, by choosing a larger post-
selection threshold Bob can increase Eve’s bit error rate and thus reduce Eve’s
information.
Assuming ideal error correction and privacy amplification, a lower bound for
the gain of secret information per transmitted pulse is given by [21, 7]
SAB = racc(IAB − τ) (31)
where racc is given by (11), IAB by (13), and the fraction τ by which the raw
key is shortened during privacy amplification is
τ = 1 + log2 Pc. (32)
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Figure 3: Contour plot of the joint probability distribution P0(βr, ǫr) with α0 =
1, r = 0.5, T 2 = 0.75. The maximum of P0(βr, ǫr) occurs at βr = Tα0 =
√
3/2,
ǫr = −Rα0 = −1/2.
Here, Pc is the collision probability given by [21]
Pc =
1
2
∫
dǫr
P0(ǫr|βc < |βr|)2 + Pπ(ǫr|βc < |βr|)2
P0(ǫr|βc < |βr|) + Pπ(ǫr|βc < |βr|) (33)
and
Pθ(ǫr|βc < |βr|) =
∫
βc<|βr|
dβr
Pθ(βr, ǫr)
P (0) + P (1)
(34)
is Eve’s probability distribution under the condition that a pulse θ was sent and
that Bob accepted the bit in his post-selection. Equation (34) can be evaluated
analytically, yielding
P0(ǫr|βc < |βr|) = P0(ǫr)
P (0) + P (1)
{
1
−1
2
Φ
(√
2
βc(R
2 + T 2e2r) + ǫrTR(1− e2r)− α0Te2r√
R2 + T 2e2r
)
−1
2
Φ
(√
2
βc(R
2 + T 2e2r)− ǫrTR(1− e2r) + α0Te2r√
R2 + T 2e2r
)}
(35)
where
P0(ǫr) =
√
2
π
exp
{
−2 (ǫr+Rα0)2T 2+R2e−2r
}
√
T 2 +R2e−2r
. (36)
For r = 0, this simplifies to P0(ǫr|βc < |βr|) = P0(ǫr) due to the independence
of Bob’s and Eve’s measurements. Equations (13) and (33) must be calculated
numerically in order to get the secret key bit rate SAB, equation (31).
Figure 4 shows the secret key bit rate SAB as a function of α0 and βc for
coherent pulses (r = 0) and for squeezed pulses (r = 0.5). In contrast to the
average gain of information GAB as shown in figure 1, the amount of secret
information SAB assumes a maximum for finite values of α0 and βc. Therefore,
Alice and Bob can optimise their parameters to achieve the highest key bit
rate once they have measured the transmission loss R2. Moreover, comparing
figures 4(a) and (b) one notes that the maximum of SAB can be increased by
using squeezed light. This is due to the strong correlations between Bob’s and
Eve’s measurements in this case as discussed above.
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Figure 4: Secret key bit rate SAB versus mean pulse amplitude α0 and post-
selection threshold βc for (a) coherent pulses and (b) squeezed pulses with r =
0.5. Channel transmission is T 2 = 0.75.
4.2 Lower bound on secret bit rate
If Eve is allowed to perform any kind of measurement permitted by quantum
theory on her part of the pulse, the analysis of the achievable secret key rate is
not so straightforward. In particular, if Alice sends a squeezed state and Bob
performs a quadrature measurement, Eve’s part of the pulse is in a mixed state
in an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space due to the entanglement created by her
beam-splitter (30). For such a situation the ideal measurement is not known.
I will therefore derive an upper bound on Eve’s information of the bits shared
by Alice and Bob by assuming that for each bit Eve knows (i) the basis set used,
(ii) whether or not Bob has a bit error (Eve might learn this during Alice’s and
Bob’s error correction procedure), and (iii) the modulus of the value measured
by Bob for his chosen quadrature component.
Let us assume that Alice sends a state in basis 1, i.e. state |ψ0〉 or |ψπ〉, and
that Bob measures the real quadrature component βr. If there is no bit error
(case I), Eve knows that her state is one of the two states
|χI+〉 = B
〈|βr|∣∣ψ0〉, |χI−〉 = B〈− |βr|∣∣ψπ〉, (37)
where | ± βr〉B is the quadrature eigenstate corresponding to ±βr in Bob’s
Hilbert space. This occurs with probability (1 − δ(βr))P (|βr|), where δ(βr) is
given by (14) and P (|βr|) is the probability of finding |βr| in a post-selected
sample of pulses,
P (|βr|) = P0(βr) + P0(−βr)
P (0) + P (1)
. (38)
In case of a bit error in Bob’s detection (case II), Eve finds one of the two states
|χII+〉 = B
〈|βr|∣∣ψπ〉, |χII−〉 = B〈− |βr|∣∣ψ0〉. (39)
The probability for this case is δ(βr)P (|βr|). In both cases, Eve is left with the
task to distinguish between two non-orthogonal states. She thus can perform an
ideal orthogonal projection measurement similar to the one discussed in section
3.3 which minimises her bit error rates δI(|βr|) and δII(|βr|), respectively, to
[19]
δI,II(|βr|) = 1
2
(
1−
√
1− |〈χI,II+|χI,II−〉|2
)
. (40)
11
0 0.5 10
1
2
3
4
loss R2
β c
0 1
1
R2
α
0
(a)
0 0.5 110
−6
10−4
10−2
100
loss R2
S A
B
(b)
Figure 5: (a) Threshold βc and pulse amplitude α0 (inset) for maximum secret
key rate SAB versus transmission loss R
2. (b) Corresponding values of SAB.
Solid curves are for r = 0, dashed curves for r = 0.5, dotted curves for r = 2.
The collision rate Pc for this kind of attack can now be obtained by averaging
over all initial states and all measurement results [21]. The result is given by
Pc =
∫ ∞
βc
dβr P (|βr|)
{
(1− δ(βr))
[
δI(|βr|)2 + (1− δI(|βr|))2
]
+δ(βr)
[
δII(|βr|)2 + (1− δII(|βr|))2
] }
. (41)
Let us now investigate the maximum secret key bit rate (31) using the col-
lision rate (41) as a function of the channel loss and the amount of squeezing.
To this end SAB is optimised numerically with respect to α0 and βc for various
values of r and R2.
Figure 5 shows the optimised values of α0, βc and SAB for three different
values of r as a function of the loss R2. Generally, α0 is of the order of 1 and is
slightly decreasing with increasing loss for coherent states (r = 0) and weakly
squeezed states (r = 0.5). For strong squeezing (r = 2) there is a maximum of
α0 at around R
2 ≈ 0.6. The ideal post-selection threshold βc, on the other hand,
is always increasing from close to zero at low losses to values of approximately
3 at R2 = 0.96. The maximum of SAB is close to 0.5 at low loss, decreases
relatively slowly for moderate losses and drops dramatically for high losses of
about 85-90%. Using weakly squeezed light increases SAB, in particular for
large values of R2.
For strong squeezing and small R2, the lower bound for the secret informa-
tion derived here decreases below the result for coherent (r = 0) states. In this
limit, the entanglement between Bob’s and Eve’s states becomes very strong
and thus the additional assumption (iii), i.e. assuming Eve knows |βr|, signifi-
cantly enhances her detection efficiency and therefore reduces SAB. By contrast,
in the absence of squeezing Eve’s pulse is independent of Bob’s measurement
result and always in one of two possible coherent states which she can discrim-
inate efficiently by a two-state orthogonal projection measurement. Therefore,
the above estimate of a lower bound on the secret information is in fact a tight
bound for r = 0, but it over-estimates Eve’s information for large squeezing.
The effects of squeezing are even more apparent in figure 6, where SAB is
plotted as a function of r for fixed loss rates. In all cases, SAB increases with
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Figure 6: Maximum secret key rate SAB versus squeezing parameter r. Solid
curves show the lower bound for transmission losses of R2 = 0.5, R2 = 0.75 and
R2 = 0.9 (from top to bottom). Dashed lines show the corresponding results
when the eavesdropper is restricted to quadrature measurements.
increasing r, reaches a maximum for r ∼ 1 and decreases again for large values
of r as discussed before. For 50% loss, SAB = 0.026 for r = 0 and 0.085 for
r = 0.72. For 75% loss, SAB increases approximately from 0.001 to 0.016 at
r = 0.92, and for 90% loss from 5× 10−7 to 6× 10−4 at r = 1.2.
For comparison, the dashed curves in figure 6 show SAB provided that Eve is
restricted to quadrature measurements as discussed in the previous section. As
expected, SAB is always above the lower bound shown by the corresponding solid
curves. However, it can be seen that the secure key rate is only increased by a
factor of less than two for moderate squeezing with r < 1. Thus the comparably
simple quadrature measurement appears to be a near-optimal eavesdropping
strategy.
5 Summary and conclusions
In this work, I have investigated the effects of using squeezed pulses of light
in continuous-variable quantum key distribution with post-selection [15, 16].
In this scheme, Alice prepares the pulses in one of four squeezed states corre-
sponding to the bit values 0 and 1 in two non-orthogonal basis sets. Bob uses
homodyne detection to measure one of the two orthogonal quadrature com-
ponents and disregards all bits where his measured value is below a certain
post-selection threshold.
In particular, two kinds of eavesdropping strategies have been investigated.
The first is a capture-resend attack where Eve attempts to guess correctly which
of the four states was sent by performing a measurement on the whole pulse.
Linear as well as nonlinear measurements have been discussed and the optimal
projection operator has been constructed. Using squeezed pulses renders the
scheme more robust against this kind of attack, as it reduces Eve’s chances
of guessing the correct state of the pulse. In principle, Alice and Bob can
achieve a similar level of security with coherent pulses, i.e. without squeezing,
by increasing the post-selection threshold but only at the cost of a smaller key
bit rate.
The second eavesdropping strategy considered in this paper is a passive supe-
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rior channel attack where Eve’s interference with the quantum communication is
indistinguishable from the channel loss. A lower bound has been derived for the
secure key bit rate which Alice and Bob can obtain by ideal error correction and
privacy amplification. Here, squeezing introduces strong correlations between
Bob’s and Eve’s measurement results. These correlations allow Bob to restrict
Eve’s knowledge about the transmitted bits by the post-selection process. For a
given channel loss, the secure key bit rate can be maximised by a proper choice
of the pulse amplitude and of the post-selection threshold. The calculations
show that already modest amounts of squeezing, such as a squeezing parameter
of r = 0.5 (approximately 60% squeezing below shot noise), can increase the
maximum secure key bit rate by over two orders of magnitude for transmission
losses of 90%, corresponding to transmission through 50 km of optical fibre with
losses of 0.2 dB/km.
These two classes of eavesdropping strategies are among the most frequently
discussed attacks in the literature on quantum cryptography. The intercept-
resend attack is the most ‘classical’ attack and one of the very few attacks
which can be realised with present-day technology, while the superior channel
attack has been shown to be the ideal eavesdropping strategy for some quantum
cryptography schemes. I have proven that the scheme discussed here is secure
against these two attacks. This, however, is no general proof of security. In par-
ticular active eavesdropping using, for example, an entangling cloner which has
been suggested as an ideal attack for some continuous variable crypto-schemes
[17] is not included here and requires further analysis.
In conclusion, this work shows that squeezing is not an essential requirement
for secure quantum key distribution, in accordance with earlier results [14, 15,
16, 17]. However, it will increase the security of the scheme against several
specific eavesdropping attacks and can thereby significantly increase the amount
of secure information transmitted per pulse.
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